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Abstract
Top-down coercive type of liberal peacebuilding has characterized the
interventions by international community in many post-conflict societies after the
Second World War. Recent studies suggest that in order to build a more lasting peace
a bottom-up, non-coercive approach is needed to balance the former and deal with the
immediate needs of local communities. In approaching the question of how peace and
reconstruction efforts can be made more sustainable, this thesis evaluates whether
strategic arts-based programs with local content have the potential to build stronger
communities by establishing peaceful resorts to settle daily disputes by participants. It
further examines three such programs implemented by Search for Common Ground in
Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen and Nepal. By evaluating the available
quantitative and qualitative data, this thesis shows that some arts-based programs are
more effective in establishing peaceful ways of conflict resolution than others.
Specifically, there is evidence that communities in Democratic Republic of Congo
have learned and incorporated the new methods of conflict resolution in their daily
lives presented to them during the participatory theater performances. However, the
program in Yemen which used episodic drama, showed no effect on changing
behaviours on a national level and had a limited impact on a local level. Similarly, the
program in Nepal proved to be quite effective in transforming the attitudes of the
people directly involved in the creation of the peace songs but showed no effects on
the general public exposed to the songs via radio or TV. I conclude that there is
reason to be hopeful that strategic arts programs can be useful in peacebuilding,
although more research needs to be done to find out how best to tailor such programs
to each specific situation and to develop a more comprehensive framework to guide
policymakers and peacebuilders around the world.
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Research Design and Literature
The level and magnitude of violence that is currently shaking all the corners of
the world might come as a surprise to some who believed that the worst is behind and
that the efforts made by the world leaders after the Second World War to unite and
prevent future conflicts would lead to a change for the better. An entire body of
literature related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding has been developed and
various programs have been implemented all over the world to address these issues.
Unfortunately, many of these attempts to bring peace ended with limited
achievements and the cycle of violence is being perpetuated.
For the past sixty years the UN peacekeeping missions have been instrumental
in helping countries torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace.
However, the presence of troops is not always sufficient. They maintain the status quo
without addressing the root causes of conflicts at hand and each election period can
sparkle a new crisis and destabilize the country. Although studies show that they do
indeed make an important contribution to the stability of peace, a new dimension of
soft power approach could deepen these processes. The emerging European Union
peacebuilding framework sets a new normative structure reaffirming that a bottom-up,
non-coercive approach is needed. Many scholars, such as John P. Lederach, suggest
that there are ways to “build creative responses to patterns of self-perpetuating
violence in a complex system made up of multiple actors, with activities that are
happening at the same time.”1 Perhaps stopping the shooting and killing is the first
step in a very long process of healing among the community members affected by the
conflicts.

1

John P. Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 33.
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Although a set of tools has already been developed within the peacebuilding
context, such as various reconciliation and truth commissions, training and advocacy
programs, peacekeeping, transitional justice, demobilization and disarmament efforts
and many others, it seems that they all focus on military and political arrangements.
Many scholars have been criticizing the liberal approach to peacebuilding, which rests
on promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and other processes
associated with modern state building but which often overlook the needs and
capabilities of local populations. These approaches are widely criticised for being
expressions of hegemony or neo-colonialism by authors such as Johan Galtung and
Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo. Cycles of violence are perpetuated because externally
imposed values and aspirations do not coincide with needs of local populations.
Everyday life of communities is overlooked as the upper apparatus of governance is
being built. Additionally, the imposition of Western values can further cause political,
economic and cultural isolation as societies in question attempt to preserve their
fragile ecosystems.
Because of such criticisms, the issue of “local ownership” is emerging in
many articles, underlining the fact that local stakeholders are not sufficiently engaged.
In recent years, a new wave of study has emerged within the peacebuilding field,
which underlines the importance of community-based approaches.
As part of this trend, this research will evaluate the effects of arts-based
programmes and cultural work as a tool to contribute to peacebuilding. My hypothesis
is that in order to build a lasting peace, adding a cultural component to peacebuilding,
is just as important as other efforts at post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction
such as establishing democracy, market economics, secular authority, institutions of
justice and strengthening the state. Specifically, I hypothesise that introducing
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strategic arts-based programs with local content can have a significant impact on
raising awareness about peaceful solutions to everyday problems affecting postconflict societies and therefore strengthening the community. In other words,
responses, attitudes and behaviours in relation to the conflict can be transformed
through arts.
I base my hypothesis on critical literature developed, in particular, by John P.
Richmond, who elaborates on the need for a bottom up approach. Richmond notes
that traditional peacebuilding leaves room for interpretation because of the coercive
top-down nature of interventions. Richmond suggests that not enough attention is
being paid to the underlying causes of conflict and therefore current efforts towards
peacebuilding are not entirely inclusive and lack the understanding of local dynamics.
That is especially the case in regions such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Richmond criticises
the current approach to peacebuilding on other grounds as well:
In many post-violence environments local perceptions of the liberal peace
project and its statebuilding focus indicate it to be ethically bankrupt, subject
to double standards, coercive and conditional, acultural, unconcerned with the
social welfare, and unfeeling and insensitive towards its subjects.2
Richmond and his colleagues describe the current approach to peacebuilding
as “peacebuilding consensus” which includes “victor’s peace,” the “institutional
peace,” the “constitutional peace” and the “civil peace.”3 These represent four
generations of peacebuilding based on Western values such as democratization,
liberalization, human rights, development and free trade. Richmond defines the
“peacebuilding consensus” as follows:
Peacebuilding consensus is […] a nascent discourse and practice of both
means and ends. This includes methods for the amelioration of conflict
2

Oliver P. Richmond, "A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday," Review of International
Studies 35, no. 3 (Jul., 2009), p. 557-580.
3
Oliver Richmond, Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler, "The Emerging EU Peacebuilding
Framework: Confirming Or Transcending Liberal Peacebuilding?" Cambridge Review of International
Affairs 24, no. 3 (09, 2011), p. 449-469.

8

through mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution,
prevention, and transformation approaches, and development strategies
incorporating multiple actors in a multidimensional process.4
The first three generations have been guiding policy makers for the past three
decades. They all focus mainly on security and institutional and constitutional reform.
Although they do engage with civil society, their focus is on the development of the
liberal state. The basic idea is that order can only be achieved and maintained when
security is provided and when basic institutions are functional.
First generation approaches can be termed “conflict management.” The
violence is stopped and the peacekeepers are maintaining the status quo. It is a topdown, coercive approach, where external actors such as military forces are engaged to
provide security and territorial integrity, combat terrorism and regulate arms trade.
Sub-state actors and institutions are largely excluded. Although conflict is seemingly
resolved through enforcement of rules and mediation, the roots of violence are not
addressed. US-led interventions in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan are cases of first
generation or “victor’s peace” type of liberal peacebuilding.
Second generation, or “institutional peace” aims at mobilizing grassroots
movements to build state institutions with the help of international actors. It is still
imposed or top-down and coercive type of governance. But it is a step further in
peacebuilding efforts as it addresses the economic and political barriers as sources of
conflict. Bosnia and Kosovo during the early phases are good examples.
Third generation or “constitutional peace” aims to create a liberal state
through a partly top-down, partly bottom-up approach. After security issues are
addressed, the liberal statebuilding project is carried through in order to introduce fair

4

Oliver P. Richmond, "The Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus,"
Cooperation and Conflict 39, no. 2 (June 01, 2004), p. 129-150.
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and free elections, respect for human rights and other democratic principles. Civil
society engagement is crucial in facilitating the transition along with consensual
negotiations with elites. Conditionality is also a means through which democratic
governance is built. East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia or Cambodia are some possible
case studies.5
What is important to my work is the fourth generation or “civil peace.” This
new post-liberal framework focuses on civil society and is concerned with the “needs
and rights” of populations:
The next graduation represents a more critical form of the liberal peace. This
emancipatory model is concerned with needs as well as rights (and a blurring
line between these categories), and a much closer relationship of custodians
with local ownership. This is a bottom-up approach with a strong concern for
social welfare and justice. It equates to civil peace and generally is not stateled but shaped by NGOs, trade unions, advocacy and social movements.6
The everyday life of citizens with respect to their local cultural norms and traditions
becomes the basis of the fourth generation peacebuilding. Populations who desire
liberal peace must in the first place be able to relate to each other on a day-to-day
basis. In other words, there needs to be a dialogue or some form of communication
between the citizens in order for them to profit from institutional frameworks
available to them in a latter stage. Richmond argues that there is also a need to go
beyond the notion of local leadership:
From a liberal reformist perspective, what needs to be considered is how to
identify the rights, resources, identity, welfare, cultural disposition, and
ontological hybridity that would make liberal states, institutionalism, and
governance viable in everyday liberal and non-liberal contexts. This requires
an engagement with not just the currently fashionable and controversial issues
of local ownership or local participation, but the far deeper ‘local-local’ (that
is, not merely a veneer of internationally sponsored local actors and NGOs

5

Oliver Richmond, Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler, The Emerging EU Peacebuilding
Framework: Confirming Or Transcending Liberal Peacebuilding?, Vol. 24 (Routledge, 2011), p. 449469.
6
Oliver P. Richmond, "A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday," Review of International
Studies 35, no. 3 (Jul., 2009), p. 557-580.
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constituting ‘civil’ as opposed to ‘uncivil’ society), which allows for genuine
self-government, self-determination, democracy and human rights7
The European Union, for example, advocates the fourth generation approach and
focuses on certain key areas such as sustainable peace, human security, and
“responsibility to protect” and also puts an emphasis, among other tasks, on
enhancing the civil dialogue through civil society actors. It favours non-military
policies in order to promote social justice through “engagement with others, their
alterity, cultures and identities.”8 The European Union’s normative legacy relies on
“soft power” and this seems to be true also regarding the peacebuilding efforts.
Although the EU’s aspirations head in the direction of a bottom-up approach and
could therefore incorporate strategic-based peacebuilding in their programs, it remains
a challenge to see them implemented. Building on Richmond, I seek in this thesis to
identify appropriate local strategies.
The approach I will use builds on liberal theory as resting on a “bottom-up”
approach to world politics, in which the interests of individuals and groups are central
and cooperation is possible even though harmony of interests is difficult to achieve
and conflict may erupt over irreconcilable beliefs, scarce goods or power among
others.9
On the other hand, it addresses to some degree the concerns, already
discussed, of the critical theorists who focus on the fact that the peacebuilding
consensus could in fact disguise the hegemonic aspirations of Western donors. It also
conforms to a constructivist view in that constructivism offers a theoretical lens,
which emphasizes the role of norms, culture and ideas in shaping the social fabric of a
7

Ibid.
Oliver Richmond, Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler, The Emerging EU Peacebuilding
Framework: Confirming Or Transcending Liberal Peacebuilding?, Vol. 24 (Routledge, 2011), p. 449469.
9
Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics:
Erratum," International Organization 52, no. 1 (Winter, 1998), p. 229.
8
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society. In the context of my thesis, it explains why promoting non-violent ways of
conflict-resolution, in other words, promoting new norms and behaviours can lead to a
more lasting peace. Helbing et al. identify two processes of establishing norms and
argue that in local environments individuals are able to create norms.
When adaptive group pressure is considered, local social norms may
spontaneously be created by random variations in individual behaviors, even
in settings, where everybody would tend to show the personally preferred
behavior. A precondition is that social interactions are focused on a
sufficiently small neighborhood. Then, local behavioral majorities will sooner
or later occur by coincidence, and group pressure will reinforce them. This
gives rise to local conformity, i.e. local norms, which are then spreading into
areas where everybody is still showing the personally preferred behavior.10
Their argument helps to explain why working at the community level could be more
effective in establishing the resort to peaceful means of solving disputes as a new
norm.
These liberal, critical and constructivist views can be applied to my cultural
approach, which is itself endorsed by scholars such as Cynthia Cohen and Olivier
Urbain. My approach is based on the idea that “strategic arts” can be effective in
building peace. In the next section, I explain in greater detail how arts and culture can
be employed to build peace with a local face.
	
  

Nexus of Arts, Culture and Peacebuilding
Culture is often mentioned as one of the components that should be taken into
consideration during the peacebuilding process. What the term means within this
specific context and why it is so crucial is rarely explained. Geertz suggests that
culture is “the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their
experience and guide their action. … [It is] expressed in symbolic forms by means of

10

Dirk Helbing et al., "Conditions for the Emergence of Shared Norms in Populations with
Incompatible Preferences," PLoS ONE 9, no. 8 (08, 2014), p. 12.
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which people communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and
attitudes toward life.”11
Culture can be therefore understood as a collective framework which guides
the lives of people on an everyday basis. This framework consists of experiences,
symbols, rituals, values, traditions, social structures and rules of interaction.
Altogether they shape each individual’s view of the world, help relate to it and relate
to others in his or her community.12 Because it is a shared structure, it also guides the
ways people see and engage or disengage in conflict. Lisa Schirch notes that cultural
groups develop a common memory of what they interpret as traumatic experience.
They choose specific moments in history, which are passed on from generation to
generation, becoming symbols worth fighting for.13 Cultural groups also develop their
own ways to handle conflict, including language, to best describe their experiences.
Often, complex rituals involving what we would call art performances are in place to
address differences. Schirch argues that using the existing cultural frameworks could
offer peacebuilders a range of powerful tools in dealing with conflict.14 Subsequently,
Cynthia Cohen poses a very important question: “what are the risks involved in
transplanting a cultural form from one culture into another setting?”15 It is crucial to
ask what meaning or connotation Western culture has in African countries, which
have suffered so many years of colonisation. Cohen further explains, that certain art
forms are embedded in sacred domains (e.g. some traditions of African drumming)
while others are secular.16 Culturally appropriate methodologies are therefore key
11

Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
Lisa Schirch, Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2005), p. 4445.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Olivier Urbain and Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, Music and Conflict
Transformation: Harmonies and Dissonances in Geopolitics (London: I.B Tauris in association with
the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, 2008).
16
Ibid., 38.
12
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because without the local knowledge peacebuilding efforts could be very difficult to
achieve.
Arts can refer to a very large set of phenomena. For the purpose of this study,
Cynthia Cohen’s approach is the most useful.17 For her, arts include a spectrum of art
forms such as painting, photography, dance, theatre, poetry, music, movies and
expressions of local folklore. They can all be very powerful tools in peacebuilding
processes. My study focuses on particular programs referred to as strategic arts based
programs. By strategic arts-based programs I refer to a concept elaborated by Shank
and Schirch:
By strategic, the authors mean that arts based methodologies be conceptually
grounded, coordinated with other forms of peacebuilding approaches, infused with
long term perspective vis-à-vis the nature of social change, and serious about
evaluating their effectiveness and impact. … If the arts are going to be useful to the
field of peace building, it is necessary to know what the arts contribute to
peacebuilding, when different art forms are appropriate in the cycle of conflict, and
how the arts are so effective in their contribution to peacebuilding. John Paul
Lederach calls this analytical process the ‘strategic what’, the ‘strategic when’ and the
‘strategic how’ of peacebuilding.18

In other words, it is important to understand not only the cycles of conflict, but also
the local cultural background and the needs of local populations. The first step is the
strategic what, or in other words the difficult choice between many existing methods
of conflict resolution. Shank and Schirch propose the following methods: 1) waging
conflict non-violently, 2) reducing direct violence, 3) transforming relationships and
4) building capacity.19
Rama Mani adds to this by focusing on a specific aspect of peacebuilding,
namely transitional justice, and how aesthetic and creative means can help in pursuing

17

Cynthia Cohen, "Creative Approaches to Reconciliation," in The Psychology of Resolving Global
Conflicts: From War to Peace, eds. Mari Fitzduff and Christopher E. Stout, Vol. Volume 3
Interventions (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), p. 4.
18
Michael Shank and Lisa Schirch, "Strategic Arts-Based Peacebuilding," Peace & Change 33, no. 2
(04, 2008), p. 218-219.
19
Ibid.
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justice after violent conflicts.20 The author sees the arts and culture at large as a means
to pursue a more inclusive approach to justice, which would take into account not
only direct victims and perpetrators but also bystanders and the population at large.
This method would involve in the process all members of the community “based on
their shared culture and notwithstanding personal or group differences.”21 Mani
acknowledges the diverse needs of populations emerging from violent conflict, which
cannot be addressed by a single mechanism of transitional justice, such as trials or
truth commissions. Cultural justice emerges as a response and another dimension of
peacebuilding efforts.
Strategic when refers to accurate timing. Each conflict goes through the initial
phase of increase in violence, which then progresses and eventually diminishes.
Certain above-mentioned approaches, such as “waging conflict non-violently” could
have tragic effects when initiated after violence has spiralled out of control.22 On this
note, Lederach makes a very interesting observation, which is crucial to
understanding post-conflict environments. He argues that the use of the word “postconflict” is in many ways misleading as it suggests the conflict has indeed ended.
However, signing peace agreements merely signifies that the warring parties found a
solution and that if they follow certain procedures, there is a possibility of a peaceful
end.23 Many conflicts continue long after the agreements are signed, specifically
because there is a need to redefine relationships. Arts offer creative solutions to
breaking the cycles of violence by offering an outside perspective on conflict and

20

Rama Mani, "Women, Art and Post-Conflict Justice," International Criminal Law Review 11, no. 3
(07, 2011), p. 543-560.
21
Ibid., 551.
22
Michael Shank and Lisa Schirch, Strategic Arts-Based Peacebuilding, Vol. 33Wiley-Blackwell,
2008), p. 217-242.
23
John P. John P. Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 43-49.
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promoting peaceful responses. He also underlines the role of imagination in initiating
the positive change within violence-affected communities.
Sustaining peaceful transformation in settings of deep-rooted violence requires a
long-term view that focuses as much on the people in the setting of conflict building
durable and flexible processes as it does on specific solutions. We move away from
an image of a single rising bell curve, the line in time with an agreement as its
product. We move toward the image of a transformative platform: ongoing social and
relational spaces, in other words people in relationship who generate responsive
initiatives for constructive change.24

Finally, the strategic how reflects the concerns presented here in previous
paragraphs, namely, how to built responses which are culturally appropriate and
effective. Within this discourse, the individuals participating in arts programs are
resources instead of recipients. Local knowledge of art forms and rituals used to
resolve conflicts become a basis of peacebuilding work. The discussion of how
touches upon other subjects and disciplines where various scholars come up with best
practices regarding specific issues related to post-conflict recovery. Escuata and
Butterwick point out that visual arts can “contribute to collective recovery from and
reconstruction after trauma.”25 Survivors of violent conflicts witnessed horrific
atrocities and unfortunately, in most developing nations, counselling or psychological
support is unavailable and they are left on their own to deal with the consequences.
The effects of trauma are well documented and can result in “significantly
disempowering distress and physical, emotional, psychological and spiritual
impairment.”26 Additionally, people are constantly reliving the traumatic events in
their minds, which changes their way of seeing the reality and dealing with others in
their communities. Failure to address this issue can result in a never-ending spiral of
violence, as most individual members of affected communities are not
24

Ibid.
Mok Escueta and Shauna Butterwick, "The Power of Popular Education and Visual Arts for Trauma
Survivors’ Critical Consciousness and Collective Action," International Journal of Lifelong Education
31, no. 3 (May, 2012), p. 325-340.
26
Ibid., 325.
25
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psychologically stable. The article by Escuate and Butterwick and works of other
scholars such as art therapist Marian Liebman, are significant in that they underline
the importance of looking into other fields of the social sciences in order to better
understand the human factor in the peacebuilding effort. 27
It seems important to answer one more question: why arts-based programs
supposedly transform relationships. Cynthia Cohen suggests that based on studies in
cognitive psychology, the author suggests, that “rational deliberations alone are
unlikely to be sufficient to rebuild inter-communal relations in the aftermath of ethnic
conflict.”28 Processes such as art and ritual can address some of the challenges related
to coexistence and reconciliation. Arts can involve people in sensory experiences,
though non-verbal communications such as visual arts and symbols, hearing sounds
and observing bodily expressions. All of these, if rooted in native culture, have the
power to transform the individuals involved in the process of instant creation.
Therefore Cohen proposes an approach which takes into account the existing cultural
framework and uses ritual as a means to overcome the limitations of verbal
expression.29 She further explains, that arts offer an outside perspective on conflict
and the “Other.”
Finally, cultural diplomacy emerges as yet another way to incorporate culture
to the peacebuilding efforts on an international level. The ideal of cultural exchange
can be seen as a non-coercive strategy used by states to advance their interests and
built relationships with the ‘Other.’ For example Memis explores the role of the
British Council in advancing cultural relations and public diplomacy. According to
the author, cooperation though cultural relations can enhance international trust and
27

Marian Liebman, Arts Approaches to Conflict (London; Bristol, Pa.: Jessica Kingsley Publishers,
1996).
28
Cynthia Cynthia Cohen, Creative Approaches to Reconciliation, eds. Mari Fitzduff and Christopher
E. Stout, Vol. Volume 3 Interventions (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), p. 69-102.
29
Ibid., 73.
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“contribute towards a stable world.”30 On the other hand, it should be noted that many
scholars, such as D.Y. Jin, Kalyani Chadha and Anandam Kavoori, are critical of
cultural diplomacy because from the perspective of instrumentalism it can in fact be a
propaganda tool. Once again a local approach would be helpful here.
Research Design
In proceeding to analyze the relationship between culture (that is strategic artsbased programs) and peacebuilding, I will use a case study approach. In order to
support my hypothesis, I first identify four cases of civil wars, which ended and
subsequently entered a post-conflict stage of reconstruction. These cases were chosen
from the Middle East, Africa and Asia in order to give a broad global context. They
are post-conflict: Yemen, Democratic Republic of Congo and Nepal. In each case, the
United Nations and various NGOs have been playing an active role in state building
through development of state institutions, promotion of democracy, disarmament
efforts and other peacebuilding tools. I then identify arts-based programs at the
community level, which have emerged during this post-conflict stage to see if any of
them have the potential to contribute to more lasting peace, which I define in terms of
strong and united communities, able to transform conflicts and establish resorts to
peaceful means by participants in settling daily disputes. For the purpose of this study
I have located three such programs, one in each country, implemented by Search for
Common Ground (SCG) in cooperation with local actors.
The first program, Strengthening repatriation and reintegration through
information and conflict transformation, targeted the communities in Democratic
Republic of Congo. One of its objectives was the enhancement of conflict resolution
capacities of local actors, including returnees and residents as well as local authorities,
30

Sharon Memis, "The Impact of International Cultural Engagement: The British Council's Approach
to Evaluation," Journal of Arts Management, Law & Society 39, no. 4 (Winter2010, 2009), p. 292-297.
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through participatory theatre. This art form was used to offer a platform where
communities can observe their own conflicts played out by actors and subsequently
are invited themselves to perform and engage in peaceful conflict resolution.
The second program, The Team, incorporated a television drama as a way to
promote positive messages among the Yemenis in order to shift attitudes towards
greater tolerance among the country’s sectarian, ethnic, political, and socio-economic
groups. The TV series was also played at the “viewing sessions” open to public.
Following the screening of episodes debate was encouraged to gather all differing
opinions on a specific topic to reach a common understanding or conclusion.
The third program, Peace Process Communication Campaign, was
implemented in Nepal and involved the creation of peace songs by people of different
ethnic backgrounds in order to promote national unity, reconciliation and tolerance.
The peace songs respected various cultural practices and incorporated musical
instruments of different ethnic groups. They were eventually played during a live
concert, which attracted hundreds of people, and was broadcast by the most popular
TV channel and the radio stations across the country. The songs’ creation process
involved dialogue and various exercises with the goal to strengthen the community
bonds between artists from different ethnic backgrounds.
My next step is to describe the programs in detail in order to make the case
that they can significantly strengthen the communities by raising awareness and
promoting positive responses to conflict where there had been none before. If I find
that these programs have worked well in terms of participants’ resort to peaceful
methods, I will conclude that they are effective in building a more lasting peace than
traditional peacebuilding programs. However, these programs may also have their

19

limitations and if so, I will present these problems in detail. In Chapter 2 I will present
my first case study: the Democratic Republic of Congo.
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Chapter 2: Democratic Republic of Congo
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) gained its independence from
Belgium in 1960. That same year the country fell into a civil war after Katanga
province declared its secession. One of the first UN peacekeeping missions, the
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was established to stabilize the
country with little to no effect. From 1966 until the First Congolese War, DRC
experienced many years of severe mismanagement under the presidency of Joseph
Desire Mobutu. For the purpose of this study, I will focus on the most recent
developments, namely the First and Second Congolese Wars, which have claimed the
lives of an estimated 3.9 million people.1
The First Congolese War began in 1996 in the aftermath of the genocide,
which took place in Rwanda from April to July 1994. When a Tutsi-led patriotic front
seized power in Kigali, 2 million ethnic Hutu refugees crossed the border from
Rwanda to DRC in order to avoid prosecution. Among the refugees there were around
50,000 Hutu militia soldiers who were responsible for the massacres and who sought
refuge in the camps, looting and killing local Tutsi population.2 The weak Congolese
government was not able to control the militia. The new regime in Kigali was not only
feeling threatened by the remaining armed groups across the border, but also grew
deeply dissatisfied with Mobutu’s regime. In order to legitimize an invasion, Rwanda
organized a coalition supported by Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe, which all contributed troops and political support to fight the militias and
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the Mobutu regime.3 Additionally, a new ethnic Tutsi leader Laurent Kabila,
supported by Rwanda and other states, was found to be a prefect candidate to lead a
rebellion within the DRC. Kabila formed an anti-Mobutu rebel group: Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire (AFDL). A full-scale
national and regional war was triggered, which led to Mobutu’s ouster after a series of
clear victories by the AFDL. In May 1997, Laurent-Désiré Kabila became a new
president.
Shortly after, new tensions arose when his backers, Rwanda and Uganda,
accused Kabila of supporting Rwandan rebel groups. This led to a new invasion of
DRC by these two states in August 1998, which sparked the Second Congolese War.
A new rebel group was also formed with the support of Rwanda and Uganda: the
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). This time Kabila sought support from
neighboring countries and with the help of Angola, Zimbabwe and to a lesser degree
Namibia and Sudan, he was able to defend Kinshasa and stay in power.4 As the
fighting continued, the state became weaker leaving the vacuum filled by quickly
multiplying rebel groups. In addition to already established militias, former supporters
of Mobutu organized themselves around Jean-Pierre Bemba to form the Congo
Liberation Movement (MLC). That same year, international actors entered the scene
and intensive mediation eventually led to a cease-fire signed in Lusaka in 1999. It was
never really observed and the fighting continued.
In 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard. His son, Joseph
Kabila came to power. The new president was trusted by Western powers and slow
progress was made, which culminated in a series of agreements signed in 2002 and
3
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2003, notably the Pretoria and Luanda agreements. Officially, the foreign troops were
supposed to withdraw from DRC by the end of 2002. The representatives of warring
rebel groups were incorporated to the Transitional Government. However, when
elections were held in 2006, many were not able to stay in power: the RCD controlled
roughly a third of DRC territory and secured only a few seats representation in the
new legislature. This was a spark which incited a new rebellion led by General
Laurent Nkunda heading the National Congress for the Defense of the People
(CNDP).5 Rwanda once again sided with the new rebel group to maintain its influence
in the resource rich DRC. It was only in 2009, that the two countries signed an
agreement, which incorporated the CNDP into the Congolese army. However, in 2012
the 2009 peace deal collapsed, when CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda launched a
mutiny and took half of CNDP officers with him. Again, the group called Movement
of March 23 (M23) received support from Rwanda.
Finally, in 2013 two important peace agreements were signed which ended the
M23 rebellion. Some experts argue, that although fighting in DRC continues, there
are signs of a serious peace process.6 I will now proceed to describe in detail how the
international and regional actors have responded to the conflict and how that has
shaped the current approach to peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in DRC. I
will then evaluate the efficacy of these approaches.
Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction Efforts in DRC
It is important to note that from 2002, international actors labeled the DRC as
a “post conflict” environment and set up their response accordingly. That is because
various diplomats saw the 2002-2003 peace agreements as the end of war. Between
2003 and 2006 the international involvement in the DRC reached unprecedented
5
6

Jason K. Stearns, "Helping Congo Help Itself," Foreign Affairs 92, no. 5 (Sep, 2013), p. 99-112.
Ibid.

23

levels. It was oriented towards post-conflict reconstruction efforts such as
disbursement of development aid by the European Union (EU) and establishment of
peacekeeping operations by the UN.
Following the Lusaka cease-fire agreement signed in 1999, the United Nations
Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (MONUC) with the purpose of overseeing the disarmament process and
supervising the withdrawal of foreign troops. It took several months before the
mission was operational and since then it has been expanding both in mandate and in
size.7 The Lusaka agreement did not produce intended outcomes and the international
community, including the United States, UN, EU, the Organization of African Unity
and a few African countries (notably South Africa, Zambi and Libya), brought the
warring parties to a negotiating table once more in 2002. The Inter-Congolese
Dialogue ended with the signing of a Final Act in 2003. One of the most important
frameworks developed during this period was the Global and All-Inclusive
Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It became the
basis for the creation of the Transitional Government and the official beginning of a
path towards lasting peace and democracy in DRC. The approach taken was a topdown solution, which dealt mostly with political issues of governance:
As mandated in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement ‘the 1+4 model’ (‘le schéma
1+4’) structured the transitional government. The administration included one
president (Joseph Kabila) and four vice presidents drawn from the RCD-G (Azarias
Ruberwa), the MLC (Jean-Pierre Bemba), Kabila’s former government (Abdoulaye
Yerodia Ndombasi), and a coalition of unarmed parties gathered under the name the
Political Opposition (Arthur Z’ahidi Ngoma). In the lower echelons, such as the
ministries, the parliament, and other administrative capacities (like the governorship
of a province), representation was supposedly equally divided among the eight
‘components of the transition,’ corresponding to the eight most powerful political or
military groups turned political parties at the outset of the civil war...8
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Additionally, a strategy was developed to integrate the rebels from various
groups into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo and police units,
which were to be dispatched in all provinces to maintain order until the elections
period in 2006. Although the peace process seemed promising, violence continued in
the eastern provinces, notably Maniema and North Katanga. Respectively, in 2005
and 2006, the referendum on a new constitution and general legislative and
presidential elections were held. The National Assembly was installed and Joseph
Kabila became president.9
The newly elected leader was cautious about the outside involvement and
eventually pushed the Western capitals to disengage politically, while the peace
process was still very fragile. Eventually, the UN-led International Committee in
Support of the Transition sharply reduced its assistance, while the peacekeepers were
focusing on protecting the civilians and could only engage in reactive firefights
without tackling the root causes of conflict. However, financial aid flowed into the
country and a policy of stabilization was adopted. In 2009, the Congolese government
declared that the conflict was over and introduced the Stabilization and
Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Congo (STAREC). With the help of Western donors,
the program focused on reconstruction: building infrastructure, deploying state agents
to rural areas and adjusting the economy. However, the administrative buildings and
roads lacked maintenance, while the officials were often abusive. According to UN
officials, these various efforts were “disconnected from the wishes of the local
population [and] perceived as predatory.” 10 The international efforts towards
reconstruction also included training of the Congolese army units. Issues emerged
when the foreign officers would receive reports claiming the soldiers they trained
9
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were not fed or paid. The ultimate blow came with a 2012 investigation indicating
that US-trained army units participated in a mass rape in the town of Minova (Eastern
DRC).
When the political instability in DRC was aggravated by 2011 flawed general
elections and the following mutiny of CNDP officers, the M23 rebel movement
pushed the international community to act more robustly. The UN deployed the firstever combat brigade to intervene militarily in DRC. Former President of Ireland,
Mary Robinson, was appointed a special envoy for the Great Lakes region in order to
instill peace in the region. The expanded UN peacekeeping mission changed its name
to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Congo (MONUSCO) and
is now the largest police force and peacekeeping mission worldwide.11 The Peace,
Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the
Region was signed by regional powers in February 2013. A few months later, M23
rebel group finally came to the negotiating table and on 12 December 2013 signed the
Nairobi Declaration. A 2015 report of the UN Secretary-General on the
implementation of these regional agreements indicates that progress has been made
and that the Great Lakes region has enjoyed a relative stability. However, the effort to
neutralize armed groups in Eastern DRC and the slow disarmament process have been
mentioned as some of the challenges. The report further indicates that 2,7 million
people are internally displaced and around “5,2 million people are affected by
conflict, malnutrition, epidemics and natural disasters.”12
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The DRC conflict remains one of the largest ongoing humanitarian crises in
the world and many scholars are attempting to investigate why after so many years of
intense peacebuilding efforts, the violence continues. Autesserre suggests that the
issue of ethnic tensions between the Congolese of Rwandan descent and the
indigenous communities had been present before the war began.13 The micro-level
antagonisms have continued to incite violence, and local leaders have used disputing
groups to achieve their own political goals.
[…] many local conflicts became autonomous from the national and regional
developments, most notably in South Kivu, North Katanga, and Ituri. There, local
disputes over political power, economic resources (especially land and mining sites),
and social status led to clashes that no national or regional actors could stop. The
humanitarian cost was staggering.14

Autesserre further argues that the international community failed to address
the causes of micro-level violence. The top-down approach was instead advocated and
prescribed procedures were applied with a complete abandonment of grassroots
peacebuilding. Additionally, peacekeepers themselves lacked cohesion, were
sometimes unresponsive and eventually became unpopular with the local populations
who called them “tourists in the war zone.”15
Based on interviews with interveners, Autesserre was able to identify two
main reasons why the international community saw grassroots peacebuilding as
ineffective. First of all, the UN officials she was able to interview, claimed that the
conflict was provoked by politicians and leaders of groups who were seeking power
over the territories rich in natural resources and therefore, a top-down approach was
the only effective solution. Secondly, addressing very complex local conflicts would
involve a coherent strategy as well as financial, logistic and political resources, which
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were unavailable to most organizations. In 2002, following the publication of the
Brahimi Report, the UN adopted a new approach to peacebuilding, which would
include the bottom-up work in the mandate of MONUC. Unfortunately, it never
materialized and humanitarian staff members remained neutral and apolitical.
Similarly in 2005, renewed efforts were made, however, they merely focused on
emergency relief such as “primary care and food distribution, water and sanitation
projects, and medical and psychological assistance to the victims of sexual
violence.”16 In sum, the international interventions included three major elements: 1)
political - focusing on the regional and national elite, 2) military – aiming at
deployment of peacekeepers, and 3) humanitarian – addressing the consequences of
violence, which also represented one of a few isolated cases of involvement with the
local populations. Other limited attempts at local peacebuilding were implemented by
NGOs such as Life and Peace Institute or Search for Common ground, which were the
main international agencies working on a local level to maintain peace in the DRC. I
will now proceed to evaluate their efforts.
Participatory Theater in DRC – Search for Common Ground
Participatory theater for conflict transformation has been used by Search for
Common Ground (SCG) in different corners of the world to enable people in conflict
to find peaceful ways of addressing the daily disputes in their lives. It tackles conflicts
linked to resources, refugees, land rights, corruption, sexual violence and prejudice.17
It involves techniques which allow the actors to interact with the public based on a
real problem. Eventually, the audience engages and participates in a performance to
adapt, change or correct a situation or a behavior that is being developed during the
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show. Participatory theater gives people the space to transform their conflicts without
violence.
Since 2005, Search for Common Ground (SCG) has performed more than
10,000 participatory theater shows in DRC and has reached hundreds of thousands of
people across the country. I will now explain in more detail what participatory theater
is and why it is used as a tool to transform conflict. I will then present the quantitative
and qualitative data to assess the efficacy of the program Strengthening repatriation
and reintegration through information and conflict transformation. The data was
published by SCG in the final evaluation report.

Figure 2.1. Participatory Theatre Performance. From: Participatory Theatre for Conflict
Transformation: Training Manual (Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground)

The participatory theater can take different forms including Forum Theater,
Debate Theater, Image Theater, Playback Theater or Invisible Theater. All the styles
incorporate the audience’s participation as the main feature of the show. There are a
few important steps that have to be taken in a specific sequence in order to produce a
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successful performance. They are: 1) information collection, 2) compiling
information, 3) scene development, 4) character development, 5) preparation of the
performance location, 6) interaction with spectators, 7) role of the director. First,
actors approach the community members and collect information about the way
people live, including the cultural aspects and customs, conflicts they experience and
who are the participants, religious norms and the community structure. After
identifying the disputes, which most often create violence, the actors proceed to
develop a story based on a chosen conflict. The performance location is then selected
in a visible, secure and accessible place. The show is promoted in collaboration with
local authorities through radio, posters, and public announcements in schools and
churches. An effort is made to invite all community members, including security
forces, police and elders.18
The actors are Congolese and go through training in the participatory theater
techniques. They sometimes were victims or perpetrators of violence and had direct
experience of conflict. The performance begins by welcoming the audience and
incorporates various elements of local culture, including singing, drumming and
dance to attract attention and build trust. Music is also used during the show to
transition between different scenes and the show uses “contemporary popular music
that is rooted in the local context” or songs created by actors that express emotions
such as sadness or joy.19 After the introduction, the conductor explains what is the
goal of the show and encourages the audience to participate in the final stage of the
play. At this moment, the public is invited to enter the stage and play out the roles
previously assigned to actors. This time instead of violent responses they must come
up with an alternative peaceful ending to the conflict they just witnessed. That way
18
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the audience members become engaged in establishing and promoting the non-violent
means of resolving daily disputes. Some performances end with a debate where
dialogue between community members is encouraged to address specific problems.20
There are multiple reasons why participatory theater can help build a lasting
peace among local communities. First of all, it offers a forum where the marginalized
populations can raise their voice and speak about the issues they face in daily life in a
neutral environment. Because it is performed in public, the audience can be anyone
who arrives, making theater accessible and inclusive to random populations. By
witnessing the conflicts as spectators the community members become detached and
are able to perceive the problems from a different viewpoint. On the other hand, the
performer seeks to offer the public alternative ways to understand the conflict
narrative.
Through performance art interventions, the past can be reexamined, reinvented and
retold in a public venue. Through a process agreed upon by the performer and the
audience, storytelling can explore multiple perceptions of an event despite obstacles
that would deter such an exchange under a different process.21

Artists can be seen as “moral instructors who can offer moral guidance
through creative expression.”22 Although the performance presents attitudes and
behaviors, which might be difficult to imagine for war-torn societies, they could
nevertheless be adopted in the long run. Additionally, art offers the potential to see the
“Other” from a different perspective. It allows the spectator to observe both sides to a
dispute and understand how underlying causes and claims by both parties are rooted
in shared humanity and anchored in the same cultural environment. This new
perception is possible because of an alternative reality, which is created during the
performance.
20
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The term alternative reality refers to a conscious psychological altering of place, in
which the individual accepts that the events and situations he or she sees have a
creative or make-believe reality. By observing imaginary scenarios, the viewer can
take in multiple perspectives of a conflict. Storytelling used in performance art
interventions utilizes dialogical communication within an imaginary environment
between performer and listener. It is important not to discount this make-believe
place as a useful fantasy. On the contrary, performance art can take us outside
ourselves and bring us back to our real lives transformed.23

Participatory theater for conflict transformation has been used and evaluated
by Search for Common Ground since 2005. The results have been shown to be
promising and based on previous experiences SCG has organized transformational
festivals bringing actors from the Great Lake Region to train them in participatory
theater techniques. In 2007 a short video and a training manual were released in
English and French to better assist artist peacebuilders in their work. In 2007 the SCG
participatory theater won the Ashoka-Changemaker ‘‘Entrepreneuring Peace’’ Award
for ‘‘On-the Ground Innovations for Managing Conflict,’’ selected from 158 entries
from 42 countries.24 I will now evaluate one of their programs, which took place in
DRC in 2011/2012 and used participatory theater to promote non-violent ways of
conflict resolution.
Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration through Information and Conflict
Transformation – qualitative and quantitative evidence
Program Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration through Information
and Conflict Transformation was implemented in 2011/2012 by Search for Common
Ground with support from the US Department of State’s Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration. It targeted the communities in Burundi and DRC with the
aim of successful repatriation and reintegration of refugees. One of the program’s
main objectives was to “strengthen the conflict resolution capacities of local actors,
23
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including returnees, residents, local authorities, and local administration” through
participatory theater.25 The data for this analysis was drawn from a Final Evaluation
Report of the program, which was based on a quantitative questionnaire as well as
interviews with participants and staff members. The questionnaire was conducted
with 401 people in DRC. Additionally, two focus groups were managed with 12 and
16 participants respectively. In total 429 people were surveyed. I will only present the
data concerning specifically DRC.
The program targeted two territories in South Kivu province of DRC: Uvira
and Fizi. It was designed to address community issues, which amounted to the largest
number of disputes among local populations. The highest priority was assigned to
land and property conflicts. Additionally, about 30% of survey participants mentioned
family, ethnic and political disputes, particularly between the Bembe and the
Banyamulenge, witchcraft and conflict because of unemployment. The region was
chosen because of the significant numbers of returnees from Tanzania (82%), Burundi
(12%), Rwanda (2%) and Kenya (2%). Figure 2.2 represents the respective ratio of
residents to returnees among the survey participants.26

Figure 2.2. DRC sample - residents and returnees. From: Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration
through Information and Conflict Transformation: Final Evaluation Report (Washington: Search for
Common Ground, [2012b])
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In DRC 40% of the respondents had personal experience of land disputes. They often
arise when the returnees come back to their land or their property after they had been
forced to flee to neighboring countries because of the war. Upon returning they
sometimes find that their home was demolished and the land taken over or sold in
their absence. Issues such as jealousy, mistrust, rumors and stereotypes can aggravate
the situation making the reintegration process more difficult. In addition, the
resources and opportunities are scarce and the climate of mistrust can quickly escalate
into violence. The state-sponsored mechanisms to address the conflicts are nearly
absent, which leaves the perpetrators unpunished. In this environment the incentives
to resort to violence are high.27
	
  

Figure 2.3: Most Common Types of Conflict. From: Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration through
Information and Conflict Transformation: Final Evaluation Report (Washington: Search for Common Ground,
[2012b])

27

Lena Slchamuijlder, Setting the Stage for Peace: Participatory Theater for Conflict Transformation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, eds. Michael N. Nagler and Marc Pilisuk, Vol. 3 (Santa Barbara,
Calif: Praeger, 2011), p. 227.

34

To address land disputes and other conflicts common in DRC, and promote
the peaceful methods of conflict resolution among the communities SCG organized
60 participatory theater performances. Additionally, 12 follow-up dialogue sessions
were held, which “took the form of conflict resolution trainings as well as feedback
and discussions around the theater performances.”28 There was a strong emphasis on
dialogue as a means of finding sustainable solutions to problems.
The survey conducted among the study participants revealed that 86% of them
felt that they were able to resolve the conflicts peacefully. In DRC the most common
methods included negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution offered by local
chiefs or traditional leaders. Among the study participants 54% were aware and took
part in a participatory theater sessions. Theater was also mentioned among the most
common sources of information about dispute resolution strategies. 94% of
participants who attended the participatory theater session found them “excellent” or
“good quality” and 95% found them inclusive of a diverse group of people including
“ages genders and ethnic identities.”29 In DRC 92% found the session useful and 82%
admitted that they have learned new mechanisms in which people can deal with
disputes through peaceful means. Two main lessons-learned were: “who I can
approach to resolve my problems” (58%) and “various manners of handling the
conflict non-violently” (53%).30
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Figure 2.4: Common Dispute Resolution Strategies. From: Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration
through Information and Conflict Transformation: Final Evaluation Report (Washington: Search for
Common Ground, [2012b])

There is also evidence that the communities have incorporated the new methods in
their daily lives. 51% of the theater session’s participants said they had concretely put
into practice what they had learned during the performances. Additionally, 95% felt
that SCG has provided them with a “forum for open collaborative dialogue about
conflict.” Some testimonies provide an interesting overview of what has been
achieved, For example, some residents explained that after participating in theater
performances they were willing to share the land with returnees.
I knew that the land didn’t belong to me even though I had bought it legally. When I
saw the theater performance, I felt really guilty. I remember it took place right after
the mess on a Sunday. I saw the life that returnees live when they return home and I
understood that I had to give up my land. So I gave it up to the returnee that owned it
and I was surprised to see that he behaved in a good way the actors behaved in a
theater.31

In another testimony a participant tackles another common issue of family disputes.
My father had two wives and many children. Before we were almost ready to kill
each other because I refused to share the land. After the participatory theater session I
went home and immediately called the other children to give them an equal share of
the land.32
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The sessions have improved the knowledge about resorts to peaceful methods to
resolve daily disputes. The quality of conflict mediation was enhanced and a higher
level of understanding between the residents and returnees was reported.
With the theatre we learned that we can help solve land conflicts between returnees
and residents as a community.33

The above evaluation leads to a conclusion that the participatory theater has
the potential to help communities learn about peaceful methods of conflict resolution
and helps to create meaningful bonds between community members. This kind of
local peacebuilding empowers the people and gives them knowledge, which they can
use and profit from. Combined with other methods of local peacebuilding such as
radio and media, it can make a positive change in post-conflict societies.
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Chapter 3: Yemen
Conflict in Yemen
Yemen is located in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula. As of
2012 oil, which was discovered in Yemen in the 1960s, accounts for roughly 25% of
GDP and 70% of government revenue.1 The country has been ethnically and
politically divided for many years and subsequent wars and rebellions caused
instability. The World Bank places Yemen among the poorest countries in the Arab
world, with 55,4% of the population living in poverty in 2012. It is also one of the
most food insecure countries globally.2 During the twentieth century Yemen
transitioned from being a traditional society to a “melting pot of revolutions
accompanied by foreign intervention.” 3 Although Yemen has been a battlefront
between three major groups, namely, al Qaeda, the southern movement and the
Houthis, for the purpose of this study I will focus on the conflict between the Houthis
and the government, which best represents the underlying divisions along ethnic and
religious lines. To understand the Houthi rebellion, which I will describe in detail, it is
important to introduce a brief historical background, which places the conflict in a
wider context.
In the past, Yemen served as a crossroad for the civilizations in Egypt,
Mesopotamia, East Africa and India. It was traditionally ruled by imams, sultans,
kings and queens. The tribe has been the central socio-political unit and the
cornerstone of the individual and shared identity. The number of tribes in Yemen is
estimated between 74 and 100.4 Their leaders called “shaykhs” were traditionally
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loyal to imams, who were both the political and the religious figures. Uzi Rabi
explains, that “the Yemeni tribes, primarily the mountainous Zaydis, had always been
the nucleus of the governing system and their loyalty was integral to the stability of
every government.”5
In the mid-nineteenth century Yemen was divided between the Ottoman
Empire in the north and the British in the south. With the demise of the Ottoman
Empire the Zaydi Imamate began to exert its control over the north of the country.
Throughout this period, Yemen enjoyed relative stability and was administered
according to tribal patterns. In 1962 the imamate did not withstand the pressures from
outside and eventually collapsed due to revolutionary movements supported by Egypt.
A new President, Sallal was appointed as a leader of Yemen Arab Republic, while
Egyptian officials occupied prominent posts in the administration and military,
effectively placing Yemen under Egyptian rule. A new republican order was
introduced and many tribes grew dissatisfied with it. A long civil war erupted between
“republicans” backed by Egypt and “royalists” backed by Saudi Arabia.6
In the meantime, the British controlled South Yemen with its capital in Aden.
Starting in 1962, the tribes felt that British rule was oppressive and demanded more
freedoms and concessions that would allow the tribal leaders to exert more control.
Years of struggle led to the end of British rule in 1967, and the creation of People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, the only declared Marxist regime in the Arab world.
The year 1967 also marked the end of Egyptian rule in the Yemen Arab Republic.
Sallal was deposed in a military coup, while the fighting between the royalists and the
republicans continued. At this point, the region became a battlefront in the Cold War.
The tensions between North and South Yemen never vanished; however some
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attempts were made at reunification. They met with constant resistance from the
Saudis and the tribal leaders of the north. Finally, the opportunity presented itself after
the shifts in the international system, notably the fall of the Berlin wall, could no
longer be ignored. In 1990, the “Sanaa Agreement” was signed by both states, which
allowed for new a democratic government to be elected. The united Republic of
Yemen was created and the leader of North Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was
appointed president.7
After the reunification Yemen went through yet another difficult period during
the Gulf War in 1990-91. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Yemenis were
presented with a dilemma. Their long-standing relations with Iraq were at stake if they
supported the West. As a member of the UN Security Council at the time Yemen
twice abstained from a vote which would impose sanctions on Iraq and ultimately
voted against the use of force to recapture Kuwait, instead advocating an Arab
solution to the conflict.8 Western powers and Saudi Arabia interpreted the vote as a
betrayal. The US cut off its aid to Yemen, while Saudi Arabia deployed troops along
the border. Additionally, Saudis expelled all Yemeni workers. 750,000 people
returned home leaving everything behind. A long period of hostility was marked by
border disputes and Saudi meddling in Yemeni politics. In 1994 a civil war erupted
between the north and south. Eventually, the north imposed unity but tensions
exacerbated as the Saudis continuously supported southern separatists.
The beginning of twentieth century, still under the presidency of Ali Abdullah
Saleh, Yemen was marked by a declining economy, and the strengthening of Islamist
and secessionist movements in the South. The difficult relationship between society
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and the government reflected years of ethnic, geographic and political divides. Saleh
used the tribal divisions as an ”alternative to a party system.”9
This was seen especially during the years 1990-1994. The regime did not confiscate
the tribes’ weapons and used the tribal heads as mediators between the regime and
rival groups. But when the civil war was over, it became clear that armed tribes and
their leaders posed a real threat to the state in certain areas.[…] The tribes did not
offer an alternative to Salih’s rule but created an additional power center that had to
bargained with, the very existence of armed tribal enclaves was a persistent source of
instability. 10
	
  

Tribal tensions became one of the major problems Yemen was facing. The Houthi
rebellion, although being motivated by diverging religious beliefs and tribal
ancestries, emerged in the province of Sa’da as a manifestation of discontent of local
populations with government policies.
From 2004 on the Yemeni government was presented with a threat of a civil
war, which still looms over the country today. The Zayidi rebels – popularly known as
the Houthis became active in the far north of the country, adjacent to the Saudi
border. In 2004, the Zayidi cleric Husayn Badr al’Din al’Huthi started to openly
criticize the government of Yemen. The conflict had its roots in the marginalization of
the northern province of Sa’da in terms of infrastructure, social welfare, education and
security. The Zayidi tribes began to identify these issues and saw their shared interest.
Additionally, they were able to reach common ground based on their shared religious
affiliation Shiites.11 The development of the Young Believers movement under the
leadership of al-Huthi marked a step forward towards this unification. Over the years
al-Huthi established schools and preached theories seen by some as intolerant and
against the Zayidi tradition of moderate Islam. However, Al-Huthi was eventually
able to gather around him a large group of supporters among the Zayidi tribal groups,
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who endorsed his criticism of the government and its policies of siding with the West,
in particular with the United States. In return, the Yemeni government saw a great
danger in the growing movement and decided to send soldiers to the northern
provinces, which were traditionally quite autonomous.
The conflict erupted in September 2004, when the “young believers” captured
the mosques and acted violently. The government decided to suppress the revolt. 800
were killed, including 400 soldiers and Husayn al-Huthi, who became the martyr of
the new rebellion.12
The fighting resumed in 2005, when the Houthis conducted a series of attacks
against the state institutions, this time spreading also to the Sanaa province. The
violence triggered a regional response with Iran accusing the government of Yemen
of trying to eliminate the Shiite community. In 2006, both parties reached a ceasefire
agreement. Efforts by the government to appease the Houthis included overall pardon
and release of prisoners and compensation. Additionally, the security forces were
willing to cooperate with any actors that would join the fight against the Shiite rebels,
including the Sunni. In the latter stage, this step deepened the religious divides
between groups, leading Yemen towards Sunni-Shiite conflict, which at the time of
writing, seems to be escalating into a regional proxy war.13
In 2007 the Houthis started to target the Jewish communities. The government
tried to appease both parties and offered alternative housing to the Jews who felt
threated by the “young believers.” The issue was never resolved and the communities
remained fragile throughout the conflict. That same year Iran became more vocal
about the developments in Yemen. Protests erupted in the streets of Tehran calling for
the expulsion of the Yemeni ambassador. Since then Iran has been accused of
12
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From Phases to Rolling Conflict

133

providing weapons to the rebels. Meanwhile, on the ground the government
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Year 2008 was marked by a series of clashes between the Houthis and the

Yemeni army. An attempted ceasefire did not last and the agreements, including
disarmament, withdrawal of the army and expulsion of rebel leaders, were not
respected. Additionally, the Houthis banned 3,200 students and 91 teachers from
attending schools in Sa’da province. That same year, the rebels assassinated a member
of the Presidential Committee, Al-Hindi, and exploded a bomb in Bin Salman
Mosque, which further worsened the fragile situation. The Houthis became more
extreme in their messages: “death to America, death to Israel, victory for Islam.”
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In 2009 they were able to take over a few buildings, institutions and the
central market in the province of Ghamar. The assassinations of government officials
and shayks from pro-government tribes continued.14 Efforts at mediation appeared
difficult and Saleh’s government was facing two other threats: the resurgence of al
Qaeda and the southern movement. Ending the Houthi issue became one of the
priorities and in August 2009 the army began another offensive in Sa’da region. In an
unprecedented way, Saudi Arabia also launched strikes on the Houthis, including air
assets, artillery and ground forces.15 In response, the rebels crossed the border killing
two guards, which gave the Saudis an incentive to continue, citing the excuse that
Houthis infiltrated their territory. This phase of fighting ended in 2010 when both
sides signed a ceasefire agreement, which stipulated the withdrawal of rebels from
Saudi Arabia and the end of hostilities by all parties.
Various groups within the country, including the Houthis, al Qaeda and the
southern movement, have been fighting each other and the government for a long
time. In January 2011 the Arab Spring swept through the country, making the state
even more fragile. Thousands of people took to the streets of Sanaa and demanded
that President Ali Abdullah Saleh steps down. The protesters were met with riot
police using tear gas and batons. In the latter stage, violent means of appeasement
followed and on March 18, 2011 the army fired at 100,000 people gathered in Sanaa.
52 protesters were killed and many more wounded. The government denied
responsibility. Some officials used the opportunity to show their hostility towards
Saleh and defected to the opposition. Among them was Ali Mushin al-Ahmar, who
dispatched forces in the capital to protect the protesters in response to government’s
actions. The region of Sa’da was previously controlled by the tribal militias of al14
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Ahmar, which now directed their efforts elsewhere. The Houthis seized this
opportunity to take control of the province of Sa’da by installing their own governor.
Since then they have been growing in power and advancing to the south.16
Although various international efforts followed to establish a rule of law,
rebuild institutions and unify the country, at the time of writing the Houthis had taken
over the capital and the port of Aden, forcing president Hadi into hiding. They also
took actions to dissolve parliament and take over Yemen’s government institutions. I
will now analyze the international efforts aimed at conflict resolution and
reconstruction in Yemen, which focus mainly on the period following the 2010
ceasefire agreement between the Houthis and the government.
Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction Efforts in Yemen
The response of the international community to the crisis in Yemen does not
seem to follow any coordinated strategy. Instead, various actors, including states,
coalitions of states, IOs and NGOs work on many fronts and tackle different issues.
Efforts have been centered around few a major problems, including: countering global
terrorism networks such as al Qaeda, suppressing national insurgencies, designing and
implementing a comprehensive security sector reform and alleviating poverty.
Although some programs were directed at the local population, most of them took the
top-down coercive approach.
First, I will analyze the regional response to the Yemeni conflict between the
government and the Houthi rebels. Saudi Arabia played the most important role here,
as it was the only state which intervened military to support the Yemeni security
forces. Already during the Cold War, Saudi Arabia was constantly meddling in the
politics of North Yemen. Keeping the tribal conflicts alive and preventing the

16

Uzi Rabi, Yemen : Revolution, Civil War and Unification (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015), p. 202-208.

45

unification of North and South Yemen was one of the main goals of this neighboring
power. Saudis not only saw a danger in having a strong oil producing country next
door. The issue revolved also around ideology. It was problematic to have a
republican state which espoused democratization right across the border. The stability
of the monarchy could be upset if similar pressure towards a multi-party system
would arise among the Saudis.17 During the last phase of fighting between the Houthis
and the government the Saudis launched strikes by air and land to fight the rebels who
they saw as a threat to their territorial integrity. It is important to note that the Houthis
have not been the only target of Yemen’s northern neighbor. Saudi Arabia in coalition
with the United States has been actively fighting al Qaeda in the region since its
Yemeni counterpart joined forces with the Saudi branch in 2009. Constant drone
attacks by the coalition have sparked protests among the local population, who often
suffered as a result of this war on terror.
Further efforts to establish peace in Yemen were made in 2011 when the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, initiated the negotiations towards a peaceful
transition of power in Yemen. The government and all opposition parties participated.
The solutions proposed by the Gulf Initiative included: 1) the transfer of power to the
Vice-President of Yemen, Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi, 2) the creation of a governmental
coalition, 3) the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections within two
months after the signing of a deal and 4) granting immunity from prosecution to the
president and his relatives.18 Finally in November 2011 Saleh signed the deal and four
months later Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi was elected President. A National Dialogue
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Conference followed as an attempt to bring the warring parties to the negotiating
table.
The recent opaque political transposition has left Yemen’s new president Abd Rabbu
Mansur Hadi – also Saleh’s former deputy since 1994 – grappling with military
restructuring, in an attempt to at least weaken if not break old embedded allegiances
and, through the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), confronting the long-standing
issues of southern discontent and calls for secession, as well as the increasingly
prolific northern-rebel movement of the Shia-Muslim Houthis calling for autonomy.19

The European Union became the major contributor to efforts towards Security
Sector Reform (SSR). Following the needs assessment mission in 2012, the EU took
steps to facilitate progress in developing the security sector. In July 2012 the EU
deployed an SSR expert team, financed by the Instrument for Stability. The experts
worked closely with the Yemeni government to elaborate a comprehensive SSR plan.
Additionally, the EU was planning to support the Yemeni maritime sector through
training.20
Finally, some efforts by international IO’s and NGO’s focused on alleviating
poverty. These were sometimes coordinated and implemented with the help of the
Yemeni government. The World Bank’s support included efforts to “create visible
improvements that are meaningful in the daily life of Yemenis, such as providing
funds for schools and health clinics and expanding support for public works, basic
education, health and water supply.”21 Additionally the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) has been at the forefront of the post-crisis agenda in Yemen. In
2012, with the financial support of international donors, the UNDP set up a program
aimed at improving democratic governance, alleviating poverty and facilitating crisis
prevention and recovery. Some of the efforts included strengthening civil society
19
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institutions, such as NGOs and grassroots organizations, which could be used as
partners in humanitarian assistance and as providers of basic needs to the population.
Security sector reform and fighting corruption were some of the strategies used to
prevent future conflict. Additionally, a voter education campaign was launched and
“240 tons of fertilizer and 120 tons of seeds” were disbursed among the poorest in the
Sa’sa province in line with the “early recovery” project in the region.22
In sum, the international community’s approach to conflict resolution and
reconstruction in Yemen was mainly based on a top-down approach. Direct military
interventions and negotiations with elites were advocated with a few initiatives
directed at the local populations. The efforts by UNDP and the World Bank mainly
focused on humanitarian assistance and poverty alleviation. Their contribution to
helping the communities was significant because it tackled some of the issues which
in a long term could lead to more conflict over scarce resources. A few NGO’s
focused their efforts on national reconciliation. In the following chapter I will
evaluate one such program implemented by Search for Common Ground.
Episodic Drama in Yemen – Search for Common Ground
The Team is a multi-nation episodic drama, which has used the global
fascination with football/soccer to attempt to change behaviors and ultimately
responses to conflict in countries torn by violence. The series addresses the disputes
revolving around existing cultural, ethnic, religious, tribal, racial or socio-economic
differences and uses sport as a means to unify communities. To better appeal to the
public and make sure that the content is authentic, Search for Common Ground (SCG)
draws actors and scriptwriters from the local communities who often experienced
conflict first hand. By collaborating with local production companies it uses local
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knowledge and expertise to better reflect the realities on the ground. The series has
now been reproduced in 15 countries and includes different geographical regions
including Africa, Middle East and Asia.
Production of The Team in Yemen was funded by the European Commission
and the Dutch Embassy in Sana’a. SCG partnered with six local contractors including
a TV and some radio production companies. Actors and scriptwriters were drawn
from the local population.
The show consisted of 25 TV episodes and was launched together with 120
radio episodes aimed at communicating “positive social messages through
fictionalized stories of a diverse group of Yemeni youth playing football, although
less than 10% of the show contained actual football-related imagery and story line.” 23
For the purpose of this study I will only focus on the episodic drama, which was
broadcast on the national TV channel accompanied by an outreach and dialogue
campaign implemented in 10 governorates where 600 viewing/listening sessions were
held followed by debates among youth, universities, local councils and NGOs, for a
total 30,000 participants. Additionally, 60 mobile cinema screenings were held in
public spaces to attract a larger and more diverse public. One of the goals was to work
on both national and local levels. Specifically, the viewing/listening sessions and
mobile cinema aimed at encouraging debates following the screenings to build
capacity among participants to interact in more tolerant and informed way.
Addressing ethnic, religious and political issues was at the core of the discussions as
well as promotion of peaceful methods to resolve daily disputes.24
As an art form drama is in a way similar to participatory theater. Although it
does not involve a direct contact between the actors and the public, it retains its ability
23
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to tell stories, which reflect the daily problems facing post-conflict societies. The
rationale behind why it could possibly help people change their responses to daily
disputes functions similarly to participatory theater. To avoid repetition, I will provide
a theoretical background provided by SCG in order to better explain why drama could
add to peacebuilding efforts.
Among the theories of social change for peacebuilding, the Public Attitude
Theory is the basis of SCG approach.
[…] peace can be promoted through changing public attitudes and building greater
tolerance in society. The method of doing so involves the use of TV and radio
programs which promote tolerance, dialogue and mutual understanding. “The Team”
is firmly founded in this change theory […].25

Individual Change Theory also adds to this discourse. It states that if a critical mass of
individuals achieves a change of consciousness manifesting in a change of attitudes
and behaviors, peace can come about as a result of this transformation. By promoting
the messages of positive behavior there is a potential that drama could influence
people’s perception and attitude towards conflict. Finally, Healthy Relations and
Connections Theory states that peace can be achieved “through a continuous process
of breaking down isolation, polarization, division, prejudice and stereotypes between
or among groups.” The Team not only promotes tolerance, but also builds healthy
relations on a local level by encouraging peaceful dialogue as a solution to daily
disputes.
The Team - quantitative and qualitative evidence
I will now present the findings of the Final Evaluation Report of “The Team”
to see if this particular program was effective in promoting the resort to non-violent
means of resolving conflicts. The program was launched in 2010, however it was not
implemented until 2012 because of technical issues as well as political instability in
Yemen. The evaluation relied on mixed methodology employing both quantitative
25
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and qualitative research. It was conducted in 5 governorates: Sana’a, Taiz, Aden,
Hajjah and Al Bayda which were chosen to achieve balance between rural and urban
location in both north and south Yemen. Data regarding the exact number of
participants in the survey was not provided.
According to a quantitative survey, The Team was fairly effective at
promoting the intended messages. However, no impact was found on attitudes and
behaviours (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2. Impact of the Show. From: Rani Khoury, Final Evaluation of "The Team" (Washington, DC:
Search for Common Ground, [2013])

Although the general findings showed that the program had a limited effect, the
results varied across the governorates. It was also evident that the participants who did
attend the viewing sessions and the discussions that followed understood the message
behind the show better than those who only watched the show on TV. Moreover, they
were able to put what they have learned into practice in their daily lives. Statements
by those survey participants indicated that they were better equipped to respond in
non-violent ways during disputes and were able to control themselves choosing
51

dialogue instead of violence. For example, a participant in Sana’a stated that after
being exposed to the show, he would think twice before resorting to violence,
indicating that his approach to conflict resolution had changed. He was however one
of the few who mentioned that their behaviors changed under the influence of the
show. 80.3% responded that they have not done anything differently in their lives
after watching The Team.26

Figure 3.3. TV - Clarity of Storyline and Characters. From: Rani Khoury, Final Evaluation of "The Team"
(Washington DC: Search for Common Ground, [2013])

The diagrams (Figure 3.3 and 3.4) indicate that the messages behind the show
were understood. Among different choices provided to them during the survey (Figure
3.4), the majority of the participants answered that “violence versus dialogue” was the
main massage of the show. The second most commonly chosen topic was “women’s
roles in Yemen” followed by “tension between different tribal groups.” Again, the
answers varied across the governorates. Additionally, although the messages behind
the show were comprehended, no major impact was found on the social views.
According to quantitative surveys those participants who were not exposed to the
program did not seem to have significantly different social views than those who
followed the show on TV or at the viewing/listening sessions (Annex I). The
26
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difference between those two groups was only in the degree of tolerance with the
latter group having a more tolerant social view. 27

Figure 3.4. Main Message of the TV Show. From: Rani Khoury, Final Ealuation of "The Team" (Washington, DC:
Search for Common Ground, [2013])

The results of the focus group discussions and interviews conducted in Sana’a
province indicated that participants there got the most out of the show, best
understood the messages and showed their applicability. Some stated that the
messages were familiar to them and therefore the show was too simple. Participants in
Haji also had a good understanding of the content but they were able to cite fewer
examples. In Taiz and Al Bayda only a few respondents could fully remember what
they have seen during the show. In Aden, participants were neither able to recall the
content of the episodes nor cite any examples of behaviours they were exposed to.
Additionally, they refused to participate in the debate following one of the listening
sessions, stating that the accent of the radio episodes was from Sana’a. This shows
that the divisions between north (Sana’a) and south (Aden) are still present in the
minds of people, who felt that they had been rejected because of an accent presented
in the radio episodes.
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The report indicated that the viewing sessions followed by a debate had the
biggest impact on the participants and were “very effective at promoting dialogue and
discussion among youth on issues of tolerance and understanding.”28 People who
attended the screenings explained that the discussion that followed helped them to
gather different opinions and ultimately find a common understanding or conclusion.
Most participants in all governorates except Taiz were able to provide examples of
discussions that have led to a common understanding; such as a discussion on the role
of the character “Arwa” as the team coach. While they had persistently diverging
opinions on the role of women in such positions, they reached an understanding that
regardless of her suitability as a coach, the decision came from the team members
themselves and that by itself it should be respected and accepted.29

Another observation was that the group that participated in discussions, especially in
Sana’a, displayed better debating skills and held more civil discussions. They would
not interrupt each other and work together to find a common understanding of issues
at hand. Additionally, some participants indicated that the show and the debate gave
them the tools to transfer into their own initiatives. For example, a person from Sana’a
said that she used the story of “Arwa” to communicate the message of women
empowerment to members of the organization she was part of. Other participants
showed a willingness to share materials distributed during debates (DVDs and
discussion guide) within their workplace, civil society organizations or at home.30
In sum, the program The Team had a limited impact on the population who
watched it on TV or participated in the screenings. However, the results varied and
the overall results show that local efforts in showcasing the drama combined with
dialogue sessions were more effective in not only spreading the message behind the
show but also in encouraging the participants to address their differences through
discussion. The weaknesses of the current approach included limited outreach via TV
28
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channels, inexperience of staff in media and insufficient marketing and advertising
activities. Many participants reported that they were not aware that the show was
broadcast on TV and via which channels.31 Given, that it was a first attempt to spread
these messages across the Yemenis and little time passed between the program’s end
and the conduct of the evaluation, there is a chance that with time, the show will reach
a wider population and have more impact on behaviours and attitudes.
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Annex 3.1.1. – Quantitative Data (Social Views)

Annex I
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Chapter 4: Nepal
Conflict in Nepal
The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal is a landlocked country, situated in
South Asia and bordering India and China. It is listed among the poorest countries in
the world and for the past two decades it has been characterized by political
instability. Since the introduction of democracy in 1990 Nepal has had over 20
governments and following the demands of Maoist rebels, it has abolished the
monarchy and declared itself a federal republic.1 From 1996 till 2006 it was torn by a
civil war, which took the lives of an estimated 13,000 people and left 200,000
displaced.2 I will now introduce the history of Nepal’s civil war and see how it was
resolved and what reconstruction measures were undertaken.
The conflict, which so fiercely divided the Nepalese society, had its roots deep
in the past. Nepal was a monarchy throughout most of its history. It was ruled by two
major dynasties: the Shahs and the Ranas. In 1768 the Shahs conquered and united the
small territories of the Kathmandu Valley. They introduced a new government, which
“institutionalized two divisive social systems: feudal bureaucracy and the Hindu caste
system.”3 For over two hundred years this ancient way based on “divide and rule”
deepened the inequalities between the ethnic groups and the castes. In fact, land,
power and wealth were concentrated in the hands of a few high castes, who had ties to
royal family. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates made a through study of the legacy
of this system and how it contributed to the insurgency of the Maoist movement in
1990s. For example, the upper castes: Bahun, Chetri and Newar constituted 37.1% of
1
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the population in 1991, however their human development indicators were about 50%
higher than other groups, such as the hill ethnic or Tharai ethnic groups. This same
principle was evident when looking at per capita income: hill ethnic groups were
making around 55% of an average Newari’s salary. Additionally, the upper castes
occupied the majority of senior positions in the government and represented 87% of
all graduates in the year 1992.4 Lack of employment, marginalization and
landlessness were some of the most urgent issues for the majority of the Nepalese
people. The bonded labor system presented yet another relic, which forced many into
compulsory unpaid labor services in order to pay their debt stemming from the fact
that they did not own any land. The cycle of poverty was perpetuated and there was
plenty of space for abuses of power among the higher and literate castes.5
In 1990, the political liberalization opened a new chapter in the history of
Nepal. Following a long period of demonstrations in all major cities organized by the
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, and amid the mounting pressure by the
ruling elites, the king capitulated.6 The organization of political parties was allowed
and elections were held a year later. Although the country was shifting towards
democracy, very little was done to address the systemic inequalities. The creation of
the Maoist party was a direct response and reflected the demands of the marginalized
ethnic and religious minorities. The new constitution proclaimed Nepal a Hindu state
and recognized only Nepalese as the official language. However, there were around
100 different castes and ethnic groups in Nepal, speaking over 90 languages. Their
rights and claims were overlooked by the new constitution. Most political parties were
satisfied with the new arrangement as it put an end to autocratic rule. However, the
4
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Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) did not follow suit seeing the constitution as a
“betrayal of public demand for a people’s constitution.”7 The Maoists had a political
and revolutionary wing. The former, United People’s Front of Nepal, ran for elections
in 1991 but was able to secure only nine seats out of 205, still making it the third
largest party in the government. The revolutionary wing (Unity Center) started to
organize to bring about a revolution.8
The Maoist strategy was simple and quite successful. They started to recruit
among the most vulnerable: those affected by caste, ethnic and economic exclusion.
They attracted the interest of the people by developing a “list of demands,” which
resonated with grievances of the disadvantaged populations.
The CPN (M) developed a list of demands that appealed explicitly to the experience
of marginalized caste and ethnic groups and the impoverished, including the demands
such as the abolition of caste-, religion- and gender-based discrimination, the
elimination of socio-economic inequalities and redistribution of land. […] Appealing
specifically to these marginalized groups, the CPN (M) demanded that Nepal be
declared a secular state, that the system of “untouchability” be declared nullified, that
equal status be accorded to all languages spoken in the country and that education in
one’s mother tongue be accommodated through the secondary level of education.9

The Maoists also advocated the abolishment of the monarchy and the establishment
of the federal states. In their view this would grant some autonomy to regions with
large ethnic concentrations based on the principle of self-determination. The
economic inequalities between the various districts were stark. Specifically the
western regions of the country were historically underdeveloped and were inhabited
by over 20 different ethnic groups. Based on this knowledge the Maoists chose the
western districts as “the key region for the People’s War.”10 During the electoral
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campaign they laid the ground for insurgency by educating people about their goals
and advocating the armed struggle as the only way to freedom from oppression.
The revolution started as a small insurgency in 1996 in the western districts of
Nepal. In February the Maoists attacked a branch of a national bank and stormed the
police posts. The government responded by launching three subsequent operations by
the police forces. They gradually became more violent and used tactics such as
arbitrary arrests, torture and rape to intimidate local villagers. Operation Kilo Sierra II
“was conducted with such blunt force and disregard for human rights that it only
strengthened the rebels’ recruitment base.”11 In 2001 the insurgency took a more
violent stance and spread across the entire country, effectively limiting the
government’s presence to the districts’ headquarters. The Maoists also started
establishing their own “People’s Governments” as an alternative form of
administration. The peace talks conducted in 2001 between the rebels and the
government proved futile and King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency. The
decision was followed by increased efforts by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) to
crack down on the insurgents. State-led violence terrorized local populations and
became widespread while more people with different ethnic, caste and economic
backgrounds were joining the Maoist movement.12
The second phase of the civil war started in 2001 and lasted until 2006. It was
characterized by increased levels of violence by the state actors. King Gyanendra
additionally suspended freedom of speech and peaceful assembly. The media was no
longer able to publish uncensored information. In 2002 the king dissolved the
Parliament and appointed the cabinet members. The elections were postponed
11
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indefinitely providing an incentive to fight for those who believed in a shift towards
democracy.13 The CPN (Maoist) was declared a “terrorist organization” and the army
was granted extensive powers to fight the terrorists. In 2003 the second cease-fire was
negotiated between the rebels and the king’s appointees. The leaders of the
insurgency did not trust the negotiators and vice versa. Finally, the talks collapsed due
to lack of progress on the issue of a Constituent Assembly. The Maoists also
demanded a new constitution, where the role of the king would be redefined,
something the government did not approve of.
The fighting resumed and both the Maoists and the RNA committed human
rights abuses. Widespread use of torture, cases of long-term incommunicado
detention, disappearances and use of approximately 4,500 child soldiers were some of
the consequences of the war. As the atrocities continued, more people grew
dissatisfied with the oppressive regime and in 2005 strikes and protests against the
royal family increased. Finally in 2006 the People’s Movement (Jan Andolan) was
created, comprising various political parties and civil organizations. The Maoists
participated in the movement but did not officially align with it. In April 2006 the
King stepped down and one month later the Maoists signed a Comprehensive Peace
Agreement with the government. The agreement marked an official end to the
insurgency by meeting some of the demands such as “plans for election of the
Constituent Assembly and monitoring and soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) by the United Nations.14
After the war ended the Maoists secured the largest number of seats in the new
Parliament and in 2008 they voted to end the monarchy. The country became the
Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and Ram Baran Yadav was elected the first
13
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President. Since then Nepal has been politically unstable, going through a number of
deadlocks due to disagreements between the ruling parties. At the time of writing the
new constitution is still being drafted and disagreements loom over the carving of
provinces. The Maoists, who secured only a small faction of seats in the Parliament
during the 2013 elections, asked that the provinces be shaped along the ethnic lines, a
solution which the governing majority opposes.15
Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction Efforts in Nepal
Nepal is an interesting case study when it comes to international involvement
during the post-conflict period. A combination of national pride, regional politics and
internal opposition to the international presence, forced the country to deal with the
peace process mostly on its own and with quite successful results, despite a few
failures.
The United Nations’ involvement in Nepal started in 2003, when it offered its
good offices to conduct the peace talks. It was only invited to participate in the
process in 2004. From early on Nepalese insisted that their fate was in their own
hands and tried to keep the international actors out of their business. This was evident
during the 2006 demonstrations organized by political parties and civil society. After
the Comprehensive Peace agreement was signed, the country emerged from a conflict
which deeply divided the society along the ethnic, religious and political lines. There
was a high level of mistrust between the Maoists and the government, who both had
substantial armies under their command. The peace agreement did not include the
disarmament of any faction until the elections, which were to be held in 2008. This
arrangement could easily lead to an escalation of violence during this fragile period.16
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At the United Nations debates were held to create a full-scale peacekeeping
operation to monitor the ceasefire. India initially opposed the idea based on its own
experiences in Kashmir and also because it considered Nepal its backyard and did not
want foreign intervention. However, as it became clear that the Maoists would not
give up weapons before the election period, India pushed for the UN monitoring
presence. On the other hand, the forces within Nepal were clearly against international
peacekeepers on their soil. An element of national pride and a sense of national
ownership of the peace process were the main reasons behind this approach. After
intense negotiations, the Nepalese parties to the peace agreement consented to a small
monitoring UN presence, which would be comprised only of civilian personnel.
Finally, the unprecedented United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMID) was deployed
comprised of 250 civilians along with UN Human Rights Field Mission in Nepal.
The rationale behind such a small mission came from the fact that unlike most
states where the UN had a peacekeeping presence, Nepal was not a failed state. The
police and army forces were still functional and could be relied upon. Although there
was no guarantee that the violence would not return, there was a political will among
the warring factions to end the conflict. The mission’s mandate was limited compared
to previous experiences with peacebuilding.
As mandated by the Security Council (Resolution 1740/2007) with reference to the
CPA, UNMIN had three main functions: (1) to monitor the cantonment of the Maoist
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Nepal Army and their arms; (2) to monitor
the cease-fire; and (3) to assist with the election to the Constituent Assembly. This
was a far cry from the typical multidimensional mission being deployed for
peacebuilding…17

Arms monitoring was conducted in all major PLA and NPA army camps.
Weapon depots were under electronic surveillance. The Joint Monitoring and
Coordination Committee was set up to deter cheating and to resolve disputes. An
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Arms Monitoring Office deployed patrolling units, where soldiers from both armies
and international observers were involved in field monitoring. Although limited, the
presence of a third party kept the casualties at a low level. Reports that followed were
generally positive about the peace processes.
The UNMIN’s electoral support was confined to technical assistance and
monitoring. An Independent Electoral Assistance Office was also set up but it was
very small. Again, the UN presence was mainly as a third party observer. The special
Representative of the Secretary–General (SRSG) additionally served as a “watchdog”
and provided reports about the implementation of the peace agreements.18
Although limited in scope, the UN’s performance during the post-conflict
peacebuilding in Nepal could be described as a success story. Whether the minimal
involvement of international actors actually contributed to this favorable outcome
remains to be seen. It seems clear however, that the sense of national ownership
created a sense of responsibility among the Nepalese and in that sense maybe sped up
the process of conflict resolution.
The reconstruction efforts were also mainly performed by the local actors. The
international donors had a long experience with Nepalese institutions and a sense of
confidence developed in the state’s capacity to handle funds. Not all regions were
equally affected by war and on a larger scale, the conflict in Nepal was seen by the
UN as a “small war” compared to other zones in the world.19 The financial assistance
for reconstruction was mainly distributed through the United Nations Development
Programme, which focused on a few major themes: 1) reducing poverty and
promoting sustainable development, 2) strengthening democratic governance, 3)
building resilience, 4) supporting Nepal’s democratic transition, and 5) promoting
18
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gender equality and social inclusion. Approximately 13 billion US$ were spent on
post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation up until year 2013.20
To prevent future conflicts, the UNDP founded a few initiatives and supported
local organizations in their work with affected communities. A Conflict Prevention
Programme was set up and focused on “building collaborative leadership and
dialogue skills” among politicians and youth leaders.21 Through a series of
conferences and dialogue fora, and with a media presence encouraged, the programme
facilitated national discussion among the elites about the future of Nepal and current
issues regarding the constitution process. Grassroots peacebuilding was addressed on
a very low level and mainly through support of already existing civil society
organizations such as Women’s Security Pressure Group, Electoral Commission of
Nepal’s Gender and Social Inclusion or Being LGBT in Asia initiative.22 Although
women occupy 37% of posts in the government, as civil society and political leaders,
this success can be mainly attributed to the fact that women already constituted one
third of armed forces during the war. On the other hand, there is little effort to address
the ethnic and religious divides on a local level. To evaluate the existing programs
dealing with grassroots peacebuilding I will now proceed to analyze the program
initiated by Search for Common Ground in Nepal.
Peace Songs in Nepal – Search for Common Ground
Program Peace Process Communication Campaign was carried out in Nepal
in 2008 by Search for Common Ground – Nepal (SCG-N) and with the financial
support from the Rockwool Foundation. The main goal was to raise mass awareness
about the peace process through the creation and dissemination of national peace
songs. The songs were performed during a live concert broadcast on Kantipur
20
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Television. The program also included a series of workshops to influence journalists
and strengthen civil society relationships as well as creation of Radio Public Service
Announcements (PSA). The process of song writing was filmed and a documentary
entitled “Journey for Peace” was produced and disseminated.23
First, I will present the results of a quantitative survey conducted following the
implementation of the program. Annex 4.1.1 which can be found at the end of this
chapter, contains the data analysis of the quantitative survey and was taken from the
Final Evaluation Report of the Peace Process Communication Campaign. It is
important to note, that the participants in the quantitative survey had access to all
strategies including the peace songs, the series of workshops to influence journalists
and strengthen civil society relationships as well as the PSAs. However, only 26% of
the survey respondents admitted to have heard the peace songs and therefore their
contribution to the survey outcome is limited. For that reason I focused on the peace
songs and more specifically on the experience of the participants in the process of
song creation, to see if it has the potential to strengthen the community and promote
peaceful means of conflict resolution among the participants. Prior to analysing the
quantitative and qualitative outcomes of the Peace Process Communication
Campaign, I will explain why music could be a peacebuilding tool.
Music is widely recognized as a powerful tool that allows people to
communicate non-verbally. Thus, it could be understood as a universal language that
enables people to unite through an external experience of sound. Music was used to
heal veterans during WWII and since then, music therapy has become a field of study.
Its potential as a peacebuilding tool has been a subject of analysis and a growing
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number of researchers show evidence of its effectiveness in the process of conflict
transformation.24
Christopher Small points out that music is not only the observable sound
effect, which we perceive with our senses but a process called “musicking.” This
process involves the act of listening, performing, rehearsing, practicing, composing or
dancing. Consequently, it relies on cooperation between the composer and the
performers as well as the public.
The act of musicking establishes in the place where it is happening a set of
relationships, and it is in those relationships that the meaning of the act lies. They are
to be found not only between those organized sounds which are conventionally
thought of as being the stuff of musical meaning but also between the people who are
taking part, in whatever capacity, in the performance; and they model, or stand as
metaphor for, ideal relationships as the participants in the performance imagine them
to be: relationships between person and person, between individual and society,
between humanity and the natural world and even perhaps the supernatural world.25

It is also through relationships and through interaction with the Other that
human beings develop empathy, which has been identified as one of a key elements of
peace. Johan Galtung defined peace as “the capacity to transform conflicts with
empathy, creativity and non-violence.”26 Music relies on cooperation between
individuals who gather in order to achieve a common goal. As such it is a democratic
participation in a process which involves emotional and non-verbal means of
communication and is based on non-manipulative, cooperative relationships. In order
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to create music the participants need to engender personal harmony and personal
knowing of the other, which fosters tolerance and acceptance.27
Perhaps establishing relationships could be, from the peacebuilders’ point of
view, music’s most significant contribution to peacebuilding. However, throughout
history songs that came out of these creative processes were often powerful tools
which incited masses of people to continue their struggle for good or evil. Mary
Travers, a civil rights activist who participated in the US Civil Rights Movement, said
that “music has always been the accompaniment of social change.”28 Such
interpretation opens avenues for further investigation into how music can be used in
promoting peace in the post-war societies. I will now evaluate the quantitative data
derived from the Final Evaluation Report of the Peace Process Communication
Campaign.
Peace Process Communication Campaign – quantitative and qualitative evidence
The results of the quantitative survey contain responses from 400 participants
who were exposed to either of the three communication strategies (peace songs,
workshops and public service announcements). They represented four districts:
Kathmandu, Morang, Kailali and Banke. 75 respondents were interviewed in the
baseline study coming from the districts of Kailali, Rukum and Sankhuwasabha. The
survey participants represented different age groups, professions and educational
levels. They were drawn from across section of civil society including journalists,
political leaders and social workers. The survey verified to what degree the following
five main objectives were understood: 1) local community constituencies know that
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peace is a process, 2) local community constituencies believe that they have a part to
play in implementing the peace process at a local level, 3) local community
constituencies implement programmes to take action in support of the peace process,
4) local community constituencies bring people together from across the dividing line
and 5) local community constituencies open a channel of communication that aims to
hold leaders accountable.29
The findings varied depending on age, profession and educational level (see
detailed results in Annex 4.1.1). However, the survey revealed that on average 70% of
people believed that peace in an on-going process, as against 40% in the baseline.
Differences could be observed among districts with participants in Morang having a
better understanding than those in Kailali. Additionally, 63% of the respondents
understood that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2006 was a document,
while 20% thought it was a cease-fire. The responses obtained to evaluate the second
objective revealed that 44% of respondents believed that they had an important role to
play in the local peacebuilding process, as against 40% in the baseline. The majority
of those who thought they could contribute to peace concluded that they could do so
by stopping the war. When asked who were the most influential actors in the peace
process, 39% of the respondents identified the national political leaders, followed by
civil society, youth and neighbouring countries. It was further recognized that leaders’
ability to design and implement policies was the reason why this option was the
choice for the majority of the survey participants.30
To assess whether there was a perception that local actors could take action
towards peace the respondents were asked where the peace process taking place. 61%
identified the province of Kathmandu, while 24% thought that peace process was only
29
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taking place in the newspapers. Roughly one third of the respondents expressed their
interest in participating in peace initiatives. 24% would do so by raising voices
through different means and 15% would organize a group.
Only 15% of the respondents believed that peace promotion at all levels could
bring people together across the dividing lines of gender, caste, economic status,
social status, language, geographical locations, culture and political background. They
also thought that it was easiest to bring people together from different gender and
educational backgrounds. On the other hand, political ideology, economic status and
religious background were identified as the most difficult barriers in uniting people.
When it comes to individual initiatives to solve local problems, 39% found that
organizing a common forum would be the most effective strategy. 21% thought that
the media would allow them to raise issues and attract other actors to solve local
disputes. When it comes to solving national problems, the media was seen as the most
efficient tool by 55% of respondents. Similarly, 70% thought it was the most effective
tool in holding the leaders accountable for their actions. Among media outputs which
could best contribute to the peace process 21.4% of respondents indicated radio drama
as the most helpful, followed by radio interaction programmes/talk shows (18.6%)
and radio public service announcements (11.3%).
It is worth noting that among various programmes aiming to promote peace
implemented in Nepal (the choice included news, articles, drama, PSAs, UNMIN
radio program), 11% of respondents indicated that peace songs/poems would be
effective in raising popular awareness of the peace process. Interaction programmes
and interviews were mentioned by 18%, peace accords and negotiations between
political parties by 13%, and TV and radio drama by 12%. Peace songs were therefore
judged as the fourth most efficient means to raise awareness about the peace process
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in Nepal (for details see Annex 4.1.1). Among the survey participants an average of
26% admitted to have heard one of the two peace songs broadcast on national TV and
on various radio stations. The results varied across the districts with 36% of
respondents having heard the songs in Morang, 34% in Kailali, 19% in Kathmandu
and 14% in Banke (Figure 4.1). These differences might stem from the unequal
distribution efforts among the districts or could be an indication that the compositions
resonated better with certain groups based on their melodies or instruments used
during the performance. The survey also revealed that the songs were more popular
among the younger generation of Nepalese, specifically 67% of respondents who
heard the songs were between the age of 24 to 45, and 28% between the age of 18 and
24.31
Although there were differences in how many people have heard the songs among
districts, this fact does not seem to influence the overall findings of the report when
questions unrelated to peace songs are asked. For example, in two districts where over
30% of the respondents admitted being familiar with the songs, Kailali and Morang,
the results varied considerably when it comes to understanding that peace is a process
as opposed to an event. In Kailiali on average 57% of political leaders saw peace as a
process while in Morang 100% had the same view. Consequently, the peace songs did
not seem to have any impact on how people understood the peace process at the time
when the survey was conducted. It would be helpful to analyse whether similar
conclusions on the district level could be observed in regard to other questions asked
during the survey. Unfortunately, the data is not available.
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Figure 4.1. Awareness of the peace songs. From: Basudev	
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Finally, the report indicated that 23% of survey participants had listened to the
Sunau, Bolou (Let’s Listen, Let’s Speak) radio program. Among those who listened,
18% admitted that they had learned how to take the peace process forward and that
their awareness of the peace process had increased. 27% of the respondents listened to
the Naya Bato, Naya Paila (New Path, New Footsteps) radio program. 24% of
listeners thought that the program was promoting peace while 16% admitted that it
had raised their awareness about human rights and women’s rights. Although the
peace songs were part of radio programming it is not clear to what extent they have
contributed to the above results.
I will now focus on the qualitative data, specifically the interviews with the
participants of the peace song retreats, where people from various backgrounds were
brought together to write the lyrics and compose the melodies. It is important to note,
that in order to assess the effectiveness of the national peace songs in a long run there
should be an effort to play them regularly for an extended period of time so that the
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messages of peace and positive transformation can be disseminated and internalized
by the general public.
According to the report, one of the most successful outcomes of the Peace
Process Communication Campaign was the creation of two national peace songs:
“Beautiful and Peaceful Our Country Nepal” and “In Your Eyes I See My Mother’s
Smile.” The songs were presented in a musical show that was telecast by Kantipur TV
and broadcast on 16 FM radio stations. Later on they were further distributed to 129
FM stations nationwide. The process of the songs’ creation took place in two stages
and brought together leaders of political organizations, musicians, poets and peace
builders. They represented different social, political and cultural groups such as
Madheshi (ethnic group based in the flatlands), Maoists, ex-Nepal Army personnel,
Tharu (ethnic group based in Western Terai), Dalit (lower caste) and others. This
representation was captured through the use of various ethnic instruments, which
originated from different regions of the country. They incorporated musical traditions
from diverse regions of Nepal and were also found to respect different cultural
practices. The songs were expected to promote the messages of unity, tolerance and
reconciliation.32
The first stage, a peace song retreat, was organized on the bank of Trisuli
River where for three days the participants were involved in various activities that
aimed at team building, facilitating dialogue and discussion to foster a better
understanding. Trust building exercises included soccer and other outdoor activities to
bring people together and interact in a peaceful environment. Aggressive debates held
in the beginning were followed by stories of shared experiences of violence and grief.
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The documentary captured the process and served as an additional tool in promoting
the positive transformation among the Nepalis.
A Madheshi participant and a Tharu participant in the peace song retreat engage in a
hot debate on their regional agendas at the beginning of the documentary whereas
their aggressive debate and disturbing facial expressions disappear when the retreat
process progresses towards the end. They initially argue on words ‘Terai’ and
‘Madhesh’ but later they agree on the word ‘Terai.’ The film captures the gradual
improvement in relationships between these two participants culminating in a true
example of friendship.33

On the last day, the participants were divided into three groups and each group
was involved in the process of writing a peace song. The groups would then offer
each other feedback based on what they heard. The second stage, a musical retreat,
took place in a Hattiban Resort in the hilly area near Kathmandu. For two more days
the songs were arranged and perfected in terms of their musical content.34
This unique opportunity of musical retreats could potentially offer people a
new perspective on their lives and how they can contribute to the peacebuilding effort
in Nepal. The message of unity and harmony among the Nepalese dominated the
lyrics: “the Terai is carrying the mountains on its shoulders, if we share love, it will
spread like love, we are the colorful flowers, we are called Nepali” or ”beautiful,
peaceful our country Nepal, the huge oceans are but drops of dew, Maruni (Hilly
dance), Jhijhiya (Maithali dance from Madhesh), Selo (Himalayan dance), Tappa
(Magar dance from the highlands), let’s dance singing peace songs.” By expressing
their thoughts, feelings and experiences the participants were able to write the songs
that could appeal to various castes, and ethnic and religious groups.35
Based on interviews, most participants “went through a process of dramatic
attitudinal change in term of dealing with differences in their lives both at personal
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and professional levels.” Because some of the contributors were active figures in the
society, the impact of their positive transformation could have an effect on the
communities they were involved with. For example, one of the participants gave up a
post of General Secretary of the Madheshi Janaadhikar Forum (forum for the rights of
Madheshi people) and began working with SCG – Nepal.
In the beginning I was totally against the people from other ethnic groups such as
Tharus. But as I started participating in different outdoors activities, discussions and
dialogues, I realized that I should respect the coexistence, harmony and unity which
are the most essential factors for the development of any country. […] My own
Madheshi friends from my student life could be the main obstacle in my new path as
we fought violently against the Pahadi together. But I am sure with what I have
learned from the retreat I will be able to transform not only my friends but many
others. 36

The report further indicated that one participant would probably join the agitating
armed groups had he not changed his mind during the retreat. Similarly, there were
testimonies by people involved in the documenting process who observed a genuine
transformation among the people.
As a general participant of the peace song retreat, I found the programme to be truly
inclusive; an honestly carried out effort in which people shared their experiences
emotionally with tears in their eyes and in which people dreamt of their effort to be
substantially useful in the peace process of Nepal.37

The diverse instruments introduced during the process of music creation had a
positive effect on the participants. One musician mentioned he was not aware that
instruments from Terai were also played in Nepali music. Another participant
changed his attitude towards Nepali songs after the retreat.
We studied the participants during the first half of the retreat – a participant said he
would not listen to Nepali songs at all! As the process moved ahead the relationship
among the participants grew intimate, helping to break down the stereotype. We
learnt why he would not listen to Nepali music and we came to understand the
reasons behind his feelings. He opened up his feelings and cooperated with us. We
did the same.38
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Although generally people were very satisfied with the retreat, some expressed the
view that they would prefer to engage in in-depth dialogues rather than having to
participate in mandatory outdoor activities. Additionally, voices were raised among
the musicians who observed that although the lyrics were written collectively, only
one name would be later highlighted in the program. The same would be true for the
music composing process where only one band would get credit despite the fact that
the music was composed collectively.
In sum, the Peace Process Communication Campaign and specifically the
creation of the peace songs have shown mixed results. Because only the average of
26% of the respondents have heard the songs, it is also difficult to assess to which
extent the results of the quantitative survey were influenced by the dissemination of
the peace songs. Additionally, the comparison of data on the district level revealed
that the familiarity of the participants with the peace songs had no influence on how
they understood the peace process. Other available data, specifically regarding the
radio programs is too broad to provide meaningful assessment of the peace songs
effectiveness in raising awareness about peace.
However, the efforts on a local level, specifically the process of bringing
people together to write lyrics and compose music was quite effective in providing a
setting for behavioural transformation. The emotional opening and sharing of
traumatic experiences helped the participants to find their common humanity in the
conflict which divided them along ethnic, political and social lines. Transforming
these painful memories to create a song for peace had a powerful effect on the
contributors who were able to better understand that peace was a process and that
their participation in that process was necessary. Although it was difficult to judge the
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long-term effects of the peace songs, the general perception was that they had the
potential “of becoming powerful messengers of peace in Nepal.”39 That was mainly
because the music was inclusive of most cultures and appealed to the general public
through its poignant lyrics.

39

Ibid.
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Annex 4.1.1. Results of Quantitative Survey
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
This study has examined whether strategic arts-based programs with local
content can potentially contribute to more lasting peace by raising awareness about
peaceful solutions to everyday problems affecting post-conflict societies and therefore
strengthening the community. To some degree all three programs implemented by
SCG succeeded in initiating discussions about peaceful resorts to daily disputes and in
many cases participants went through a positive behavioural transformation.
However, in the case of Yemen and Nepal, there were indications that the programs
had limited results in achieving their goals, especially on a national as compared to
local level.
The Team in Yemen was the least promising of all three programs and it offers
a few interesting insights on strategic arts-based programs and the conditions under
which they are most effective. Although the findings of the final evaluation report
showed that the program had little impact on changing the attitudes of the survey
participants, the results varied across the governorates. Additionally, the report
revealed that efforts at disseminating the art project, that is the episodic drama, on a
local level when combined with discussions, had a much greater impact on the
participants. This attests again to the fact that local input has a better chance of
achieving the desired outcomes than similar efforts on a national level.
Another reason why the program was not able to perform at its best capacity
might have been the timing of its implementation. Year 2011, when it was launched,
was marked by a violent uprising: the Arab Spring. As mentioned before, in order for
strategic arts programs to be successful the right strategy has to be implemented at the
right time. Although it was difficult to predict the emergence of Arab Spring
uprisings, they could have potentially undermined the program’s overall performance.

Similarly, in Nepal, the Peace Process Communication Campaign program
seems to have had the biggest impact on the participants of the peace song and
musical retreats judging by the qualitative assessments as opposed to its effect on the
larger population of Nepal which was small, based on the quantitative survey. In the
case of Nepal it was clear that music served as a tool or a focal point which brought
together very diverse groups of people who normally would not have interacted with
each other in a peaceful environment. The musical processes combined with trust
building exercises created an atmosphere of confidence and reconciliation, where
people opened up to speak about their traumatic experiences and connected
emotionally. The testimonies indicated that strong bonds were established between
participants who previously fought with each other. Additionally, there was a better
understanding among contributors of what the peace process was and how they could
contribute to it by resorting to non-violent means of resolving daily disputes.
The program Strengthening repatriation and reintegration through
information and conflict transformation implemented in DRC was the most
successful in achieving desired goals, namely strengthening the conflict resolution
capacities of local actors. It could serve as an example of a strategic arts based
program, which was implemented at the right time, using appropriate strategies and
addressing the most urgent issues of the population at hand.
Participatory theater was accessible to all people and there was no need to
have electricity or a TV set in order to participate. In DRC, where access to such basic
needs is limited, this strategy was crucial. Additionally, the interviews conducted with
villagers before the performances provided the best possible content for the theater
piece and the discussion. Through the interviews the actors identified the sources of
disputes among the community members, therefore using the arts to address the issues
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which were the most important at a given moment. They used the right techniques at
the right time, for example, by playing out scenes of land conflicts in regions and at a
time when the refugees would come back to their properties. The testimonies and
results of quantitative surveys show the increased levels of awareness about peaceful
methods of conflict resolution such as dialogue and mediation.
In all three cases, there was an effort to use art as an external platform and a
creative space for people where they could see their problems from an outside
perspective. Through its universal appeal, disconnected from any political or ethnic
affiliation, art became a safe space where people of all diverse backgrounds could
meet, participate in the creative act and then through discussions find common
ground.
The testimonies of the participants proved that these processes were
instrumental in initiating a behavioural change. This might seem insignificant taking
into consideration the limited scope of these programs and the relatively small number
of participants. Nevertheless, their potential for spreading norms of non-violent means
of conflict resolution is remarkable. This is because, unlike other programs aiming at
poverty alleviation or economic empowerment, these programs promote new ways of
thinking and interacting with the Other, whether he or she represents a different caste,
ethnic group or political party. The issues which lie at the core of the conflicts in most
developing countries cannot be resolved any time soon. Poverty, economic inequality,
access to resources, land conflicts and other issues worth fighting for will remain the
characteristics of these societies for many years to come. Although addressing these
problems is equally important, arts-based programs with local content could help
foster a more peaceful environment where financial aid and economic empowerment
programs could reach their full potential.
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